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Over the past thirty years, the practices of everyday life have become increasingly 
infused with and mediated by software and captured in code. Software is increasingly 
embedded into objects and systems as a means to enhance and manage usage and to 
link together disparate and distanciated parts of an infrastructure, enabling new and 
refined processes. In some cases, such as air transportation, this embedding has 
become so pervasive and vital that if the software crashes one part of the system 
grinds to a halt, subsequently disrupting other aspects of air travel. In this article, we 
examine one part of this system, the profiling and screening of passengers, to argue 
that the use of software has engendered a new form of governmentality — mundane 
management — that is having a profound effect on the operation and regulation of air 
travel. The development of distributed information systems has enabled governments 
and air travel businesses to capture, cross–reference and regulate the ongoing status of 
individuals in ways that were previously difficult, if not impossible. By linking these 
capta together, a dense rhizomic assemblage of power/knowledge is being created; 
what is at best oligoptic (partial and selective) in nature is becoming more panoptic 
(all–seeing ). This is especially the case given the trend towards increased granularity 
(resolution) and uniqueness (unique identification based on biometrics) of capta, and 
the fact that capta stored are unlikely ever to be deleted. These systems are not 
without their problems, particularly with regard to civil liberties. However, new 
procedures and technologies have largely been greeted by the public with 
ambivalence or welcomed, rather than resisted. 
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The power of code 
Over the past thirty years, the practices of everyday life have become increasingly 
infused with and mediated by software and captured in code. Whatever the task or the 
realm — domestic living and the home, working and the workplace, consuming and 
sites of leisure and consumption, traveling and modes of transportation, 
communicating and technologies of communication — software makes a difference to 
how everyday life takes place. Software is increasingly embedded into objects and 
systems as a means to enhance and manage usage and to link together disparate and 
distanced parts of an infrastructure — to make life easier, more productive, more 
competitive, more value–added, and so on. It also enables new and refined processes, 
for example through the generation, storage, profiling, screening and communication 
of capta [1] about individual passengers (Dodge and Kitchin, 2005). In some cases, 
such as air transportation, this embedding has become so pervasive and vital that if 
the software ‘crashes’ one part of the system grinds to a halt, subsequently disrupting 
other aspects of air travel. For example, software is essential to booking flights, 
checking–in, security checks, planes’ systems, air traffic control, processing 
immigration and customs, which when taken together form a coded assemblage that 
defines the practices and experiences of air travel (Dodge and Kitchin, 2004). 
In this paper, we examine one part of this system — the profiling and screening of 
passengers — to argue that the use of software has engendered a new form of 
governmentality (how populations are managed; consisting on the one hand the 
techniques and practices of government, and on the other the discourses that 
rationalize and legitimate them) — that we term mundane management — that is 
having a profound effect on the operation and regulation of air travel. In short, 
software changes how passengers are managed and regulated because the 
development of distributed information systems have enabled governments and air 
travel businesses to capture, cross-reference and regulate the ongoing status (across 
dimensions of their choosing) of individuals in ways that were previously difficult, if 
not impossible, especially for whole populations. Information systems and the 
software for analyzing them provide a means of representing, collating, sorting, 
categorizing, matching, profiling, and regulating individuals; of generating 
information, knowledge and control through processes of abstraction, computation, 
modeling and classification (Dodge and Kitchin, 2005). By linking these capta 
together a dense rhizomic assemblage of power/knowledge is being created; what is at 
best oligoptic (partial and selective) in nature is becoming more panoptic (‘all—
seeing’). This is especially the case given the trend towards increased granularity 
(resolution) and uniqueness (unique identification based on biometrics) of capta, and 
that capta stored is unlikely to ever be deleted given the ease and the falling cost of 
capta storage (Dodge and Kitchin, 2005). These systems are, we contend, not without 
their problems, with particular potential dangers with regards to civil liberties (e.g., 
privacy and discrimination). And yet, new procedures and technologies have largely 
been greeted by the public with ambivalence or welcomed, rather than resisted. 
In order to make sense of this new mode of governmentality in the next section we 
examine two theories concerning the generation and use of information about 
individuals the surveillance model and the capture model, formulating a new hybrid 
capture–surveillance model. We then illustrate this model with respect to new 
passenger screening and profiling programs. In the final section we highlight some of 
the concerns about the development of such programs and hypothesize how they have 
quickly become hegemonic in status, ambivalently accepted and little resisted by 
passengers, before drawing some conclusions. 
  
 
Mundane management 
Governmentality has clearly been a consistent feature of societies for millennia. 
Further, it is clear that the rationalities, processes and mechanisms of governmentality 
change periodically given the invention of new technologies, new modes of economic 
production, or the development and growth of new ideologies. In some cases, the shift 
from one regime to the next is gradual and seemingly benign with limited overt 
resistance (e.g. the Enlightenment transfer from a feudal system to more modern state 
bureaucracies; Higgs, 2001). In other cases, the attempted shift to another form of 
governmentality is more violent resisted or bloody in its execution and maintenance. 
Here, we are interested in the former, the seemingly banal or ambivalent introduction 
and acceptance of a new mode of governmentality and its quick positioning as a 
hegemonic formation; that is, how new forms of capta generation, its analysis and 
application, along with new moral, political and cultural values, become accepted as 
the ‘natural’ and dominant order; how new practices ideas, beliefs, and values of 
governmentality come to be seen as desirable, inevitable, taken–for–granted and 
commonsense, even if they have (potential) negative consequences for many. 
Foucault’s genealogies (1976, 1978) sought to trace the development of a new mode 
of governmentality in the nineteenth century, charting the shift from feudal to modern 
society. Foucault details the development of new apparatus of governance, 
underpinned by sophisticated, objective, universal and ‘scientific’ technologies 
(including national censuses and the routine collection of health records, school 
attendance, criminal records, tax records, registration of births, deaths, marriages, and 
so on). These apparatus, Foucault argues, sought to create a statist, panoptic gaze cast 
upon a nation’s citizens, working to manage and discipline them mainly through a 
self–disciplining effect. This effect is best illustrated through Foucault’s discussion of 
Jeremy Bentham’s panoptic prison. In this prison design, prisoners occupy cells that 
are always visible to a prison guard. However, prisoners do not know if the guard is 
watching or not, but are conditioned into self–disciplining their behavior given the 
threat that they might be under surveillance. 
These systems are, we contend, not without their 
problems, with particular potential dangers with 
regards to civil liberties (e.g., privacy and 
discrimination). And yet, new procedures and 
technologies have largely been greeted by the 
public with ambivalence or welcomed, rather than 
resisted. 
Foucault posits that the practices and technologies of this new mode of surveying 
governmentality became hegemonic because they were mobilized, supported and 
made rationale through a powerful set of discourses, which disciplined individuals to 
its logic. These discourses fused knowledge with power to create a powerful 
discursive regime. In Foucault’s account, a discursive regime succeeds in maintaining 
the hegemonic status quo because it creates a disciplinary grid that makes it difficult 
to challenge. That is, the discourses that maintain the hegemony effectively neutralize 
acts of resistance by ensuring that resistive acts are judged on the terms of the 
hegemony (in this sense, freedom fighting is always judged as terrorism; nomadic is 
always judged in opposition to sedentary), and new forms of governmentality induce 
modes of self–disciplining as well as disciplining. In other words, the hegemony 
becomes the norm by which acts are judged, including by those who resist. 
It should be noted however, that, contra Foucault, hegemonic surveillance formations 
are not simply reproduced through disciplining people to their logic. Indeed, we 
would argue that the much of the power of their discursive regimes stems from their 
seductive qualities (see Dodge and Kitchin, 2005). Following Althusser (1971), we 
would suggest that a discursive regime induces a process of interpellation wherein 
people willingly and voluntarily subscribe to and desire its logic. This is because a 
mode of governmentality is always productive — its makes society (feel) safer, more 
efficient, healthier, reduces transaction costs, and so on. Its disciplining effects are a 
price worth paying for most citizens due to its associated real benefits. These benefits 
are often positioned as forms of empowerment, for example how CCTV surveillance 
is positioned vis–à–vis women’s safety. 
The discussion, so far, has considered governmentality as underpinned by surveillance 
that seeks ultimately to create a panoptic gaze that discipline subjects. Following, and 
extending, Agre (1994), we think it profitable to broaden this view and to recognize 
new techniques of governmentality with regards to individuals, and information 
concerning them, that are better characterized through a model of capture. Agre (1994) 
posits that the surveillance model is a statist, centrally organized, and externally 
operated set of systems for gathering information about people. That is, the 
information collected is usually for the purposes of governance, a state organization is 
responsible for collating, sorting and managing the information, and the mode of 
surveillance is separate to what is being surveyed (e.g., a camera system monitoring a 
workplace). The capture model recognizes a fundamental shift in how information is 
gathered, by whom, and for what purposes. The capture model acknowledges that the 
mechanisms by which information is gathered is increasingly an integral part of the 
same system that they seek to monitor and regulate (e.g., a computer operation system 
logs its own use by an individual) and that these mechanisms in turn re–define and re–
configure that system (e.g. change workplace practices), quite often in real–time. 
Agre (1994) argues that this modes of informational capture is possible because a 
grammar of action (formalized rules) has been imposed on a system. A grammar of 
action is a means of systematically representing aspects of the world, an organized 
language for modeling human behaviors. They lie at the heart of systems that utilize 
computing — databases consist of variables that represent people and things, and 
software is inherently rule–based, formalized and designed to process and model 
information. In other words, software code are grammars of action. Agre [2] notes 
that “once a grammar of action has been imposed upon an activity, the discrete units 
and individual episodes of the activity are more readily identified, verified, counted, 
measured, compared, represented, rearranged, contracted for, and evaluated.” 
If the grammar provides the rules by which the system works then the capta ontology 
supplies the accompanying vocabulary. The capta ontology refers to what information 
is collected (capta fields), its representational form, and how it is structured. In most 
computational systems capta are specified fields (e.g. age, gender, etc.), the 
representational form are digital identification codes, and they are structured into 
relational databases. The ontology defines the limits to the system as a system can 
only process what it captures and represents. As noted above, many facets of 
everyday life are now mediated by software and information systems, with aspects 
captured, given representation form, and processed by grammars of action. 
Within the capture model, the disciplining of behavior is integral to the system as it is 
an inherent aspect of the grammar of action — it actively shapes how the system is 
used. For example, the use of an online airline booking system recasts how tickets are 
bought — the nature of the activity changes. This, in turn, “re–orders behavior so that 
it is more amenable to capture.” [3] In other words, grammars of action necessarily 
structure activity. A recent example of this in the U.K. is the switch to “chip–and–
pin” in authorizing payment card transactions where traditional surveillance 
verification of the signature by the cashier has been replaced by grammar of action 
determined algorithmically by pin number. That said, as Agre [4] notes, there is 
always some flexibility: “people engaged in captured activity can engage in an infinite 
variety of sequences of action, provided these sequences are composed of the unitary 
elements and means of combination prescribed by the grammar of action.” Further, 
unlike the surveillance model where techniques of power are permanently visible, if 
discontinuous in action, to ensure the automatic functioning of power within the 
capture model they are often hidden and unknown, and thus more subtle in their 
effects [5]. 
The shift from a surveillance to capture model is technologically (the mode of capture 
is reliant on software code that can operationalise capta ontologies and the grammars 
of action) and market driven (wherein information is recognized as both a product and 
representation). Whereas information in the surveillance model is seen to be 
centralized and for the purpose of disciplining, within the capture model information 
is seen as diverse and for many purposes (including for commercial purposes, to 
create competitive advantage, increase efficiency and productivity, and so on, not 
simply regulation), often locally organized, and structured and used by single or select 
institutions. Agre (1994) draws five distinctions between the surveillance model (as 
typified by Foucaultian analyses) and the capture model, to which we have added 
several more (see Table 1). 
  
Table 1: Contrasting the surveillance and capture models 
Parameters Surveillance model Capture model 
Metaphor Vision Linguistic 
Site Collection of information external to a system 
Capture of information inherent 
to a system 
Extent Selective, but threatens exhaustive Exhaustive 
Mechanism Disciplines through self–disciplining Manages by reshaping activity 
Visibility Always visible Often hidden, sometimes deliberately secret 
Capta Collected information is representation 
Captured information is 
representation and product 
Agency People operated (e.g. somebody watches the camera or reads the file)
Software operated (e.g. 
automated) 
Viewfield Static (at fixed points with fixed views) 
Typically distributed and 
increasingly mobile 
Temporality Partially dynamic, usually used retrospectively 
Dynamic — updates and 
potentially regulates in real–time
Organization Centrally organized and structured (statist) 
Diverse, locally organized, 
institutionally structured 
(network) 
Predictability Non–predictive Sometimes predictive, facilitates simulation 
  
We would posit that while the surveillance model is legitimated through a discursive 
regime that is politically (statist and centrally) driven, that the capture model is 
championed predominantly through an organizational and economic regime that is 
more diffuse and localized (forwarded by groups and sectors with vested interests). 
Further, given that grammars of action are an inherent (constituent) part of a system 
they are less easily opposed than perhaps the imposition of a separate system might be. 
Together, the strong, overlapping legitimating regimes, and the sense that monitoring 
and regulation is an inherent and mundane aspect of new computational systems, 
means that the new form of governmentality is inevitable, and thus quickly becomes 
taken–for–granted and seen as mundane or banal in character. Hence, the reason we 
use the term ‘mundane management’ (see discussion section). 
As detailed, Agre’s capture model has utility in thinking through the effects of 
software on new forms of governmentality. Clearly, the ways in which capta is 
generated and how it is being used has changed with the use of information systems 
and the widespread introduction of grammars of action to activities. That said, the 
surveillance model still persists, particularly in the areas of law enforcement and 
crime prevention. Moreover, given the drive towards pervasive computing, the 
capture model is still open to use by states for mass surveillance in ways that (self)–
discipline. As illustrated below, this is particularly the case with regards to issues such 
as national security and the policing of borders, or the delivery of nationalized 
services such as welfare provision. In many ways then, a new conceptual model is 
needed that consists of a spectrum — from the traditional surveillance model, little 
effected by grammars of action, through capture models that are used for traditional–
style, statist surveillance, to capture models limited to specific systems. As illustrated 
below, air travel constitutes a capture–surveillance model that is operated largely by 
statist institutions, but with cooperation with private business where necessary. 
  
 
Airport security and immigration 
Perhaps the most visible and technologically significant example of the introduction 
of mundane management is the regulation of national and international air travel. Two 
different but related issues have helped to transform the regulation of people traveling 
by air between locations in the last decade. First, growing security fears culminating 
with the 9/11 attacks has led to a transformation in security procedures. Second, moral 
panics over illegal immigrants have led to reforms in immigration procedures. In both 
cases, information systems have become vital pieces of infrastructure, introducing 
new grammars of action that seek to identify and evaluate the risk and true identity of 
travelers, and which are supported by a powerful discursive regime that focuses on 
law enforcement and counter–terrorism, and citizenship and fraud. The systems being 
developed, we would argue, are examples of our hybridized capture–surveillance 
model. In America these include the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (US–VISIT), APIS (Advanced Passenger Information System), and 
Secure Flight programs. In the U.K., Project Semaphore, the first phase of the e–
Borders program [6]. Other systems are being developed and piloted in other 
countries, such as the Smart Borders in Canada (Canadian Government, 2004). These 
programs aim to strengthen border controls by identifying and tracking people prior to 
and as they travel, verifying their departure, and building up a profile of individual 
movements over time. 
The US–VISIT system is operated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and aims to regulate the flow of people in and out of the U.S. For those 
needing a visa to travel to America, biometric data (digital finger–scans and 
photographs) is a key form of capta, collected at the point of application (usually a 
U.S. Consol office in the country of origin) and checked against a system of 
interlinked databases for known criminals and suspected terrorists. When the traveler 
arrives in the U.S. the same biometrics are used to verify that the person is that same 
one that received the visa. For countries who have a visa waiver program (most 
OECD nations), travelers must travel with a biometric passport or be photographed 
and fingerprinted on entry (European Commission, 2004). The system is being 
developed and operated by the Accenture–led Smart Border Alliance, through a 
contract worth up to US$10bn over the next 10 years (Leyden, 2004). At its core, the 
system will consist of the integration of three existing DHS systems: The Arrival and 
Departure Information System (ADIS), The Passenger Processing Component of the 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), and the Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) (DHS, 2004a) (see Table 2). The system 
produced will have a 100–year data retention period and the data contained within 
will be shared with “other law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, local, 
foreign, or tribal level” who “need access to the information in order to carry out their 
law enforcement duties” (DHS 2003, cited in Privacy International, 2004). Indeed, the 
capta US–VISIT generates will be used for: 
  
“identifying, investigating, apprehending, and/or removing 
aliens unlawfully entering or present in the United States; 
preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens into the United 
States; facilitating the legal entry of individuals into the 
United States; recording the departure of individuals 
leaving the United States; maintaining immigration control; 
preventing aliens from obtaining benefits to which they are 
not entitled; analyzing information gathered for the purpose 
of this and other DHS programs; or identifying, 
investigating, apprehending and prosecuting, or imposing 
sanctions, fines or civil penalties against individuals or 
entities who are in violation of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), or other governing orders, treaties or 
regulations and assisting other Federal agencies to protect 
national security and carry out other Federal missions.” [7] 
  
This sharing of capta across agencies is problematic in that the capta will potentially 
be open to use by the 199 data mining programs identified by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) in U.S. government departments (Privacy International, 2004) for 
purposes beyond security and immigration. 
  
Table 2: US–VISIT increment 2 processes and data usage 
Source: DHS, 2004a 
System/Application Data In Data Out 
TECS 
Passenger manifest, admission data, 
photo (NIV), visa data (NIV), 
DocKey 
Visa data (NIV), 
passenger manifest, 
DocKey (including 
biographic watch list 
hit/match), photo (NIV), 
admission data, audit 
log 
IDENT DocKey, photo, fingerprints, biographic data (watch list updates) 
DocKey (including 
biometric watch list 
hit/match), fingerprints, 
audit log 
ADIS 
Passenger manifest, admission data, 
DocKey, complete name, DoB, 
gender, country of birth, nationality, 
U.S. destination address, visa class, 
visa number, passport number, 
country of issuance, SSN18, alien 
number, I–94 number, POE, entry 
date, POD, departure date, admission 
data (current/requested), case status, 
SEVIS status change date, SEVIS ID 
(current/requested) 
DocKey, complete 
name, DoB, gender, 
nationality, visa type, 
visa number, passport 
number, country of 
issuance, POE, entry 
date, POD, departure 
date, admission data, 
SEVIS ID, SEVIS 
status, status change 
date, audit log 
Workstation 
Travel document data, visa data, 
passenger manifest, DocKey 
(including biographic and biometric 
watch list hit/match), photo, 
fingerprints, admission data, I–94 
data 
Updated passenger 
manifest, DocKey, 
photo, fingerprints, 
admission data, I–94 
data 
Departure Device TBD pending exit pilot Evaluation TBD pending exit pilot Evaluation 
Candidate 
Verification Tool 
(CVT) 
Candidate & subject fingerprints, 
FINs, photos, verification history Verification decision 
Secondary Web Tool Encounter data, FIN (previous encounter)   
  
US–VISIT is the successor to NSEERS (National Security Entry Exit Registration 
System) implemented from September 2002 by the Department of Justice (DHS, 
2003). NSEERS focused initially on the non–immigrant alien population from 
designated countries that were deemed to be of risk to national security post 9/11 (Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, 
North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan; UT Watch, 2003) and “others who met a combination of 
intelligence–based criteria that identified them as a potential security risk.” (DHS, 
undated) Selection was twofold, with inspectors able to refer any individual, based on 
national security criteria and intelligence reports, to a detailed examination, and all 
males born on or before 15 November 1986, required to register at a local district 
immigration office (including an interview and the collection of fingerprints and a 
photograph) (Findbiometrics, 2003). 
APIS targets suspect or high–risk passengers by 
checking for matches against a multi–agency 
database ... 
In addition to US–VISIT, passengers on international flights will continue to be pre–
screened by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) using APIS (Advanced 
Passenger Information System). APIS uses information from the machine–readable 
part of a passport along with information supplied by air carriers. (This links to other 
layers, i.e., international standards in the capta ontology of passports determined by 
U.N. quango ICAO.) APIS requires international air carriers to provide U.S. Customs 
with “an electronic manifest detailing the name, date of birth, sex, travel document 
number, and nationality of the document of each passenger and crew member before 
the aircraft lands in the United States.” (U.S. Customs, 2001) APIS targets suspect or 
high–risk passengers by checking for matches against a multi–agency database, the 
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) and the FBI’s National Crime 
Information Center wanted persons files. IBIS includes the combined databases of 
U.S. Customs, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the State 
Department, and 21 other federal agencies (U.S. Customs, 2001). APIS data is also 
compiled in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Arrival 
and Departure Information System (ADIS) to match arrivals with departures, with 
information on students forwarded to to the Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System (SEVIS) (Findbiometrics, 2003). 
In addition to airport screening, as part of the US–VISIT program, the U.S. DHS 
plans to begin issuing special identification devices to foreign visitors arriving by foot 
and by car by 31 July 2005 (Gilbert, 2005); tests began in the of 2006 [8]. The devices 
will contain a RFID (radio frequency identification) chip that uniquely identifies the 
visitor. Border officials will be able to scan the chips from a distance, with the visitor 
details broadcast via radio signal. Two other programs include C–TPAT (Customs–
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism) (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, undated 
a), an opt–in scheme where in return for expedited processing at border crossings 
shippers prove they have strengthened the security of their supply chains, and the 
Container Screening Initiative (CSI; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, undated b) 
that identifies and target high–risk containers using intelligence information to 
identify and target containers that pose a risk for terrorism, and pre–screens containers 
at the port of departure using technologies such as radiation detectors and large–scale 
radiographic imaging machines (Rothman, 2004). 
US–VISIT is to be complemented the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA, 
a division of DHS) “system of systems” approach to security which includes the 
screening of baggage and passengers, fortified cockpit doors, federal air marshals 
aboard flights, armed federal flight deck officers and the Secure Flight program (DHS, 
2004b). The Secure Flight program monitors internal flights, and accordingly 
American citizens. Secure Flight is the replacement for the CAPPS (Computer 
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) program and is effectively the much–
maligned CAPPS II program under a different name — the main differences being 
that the system will only look for known or suspected terrorists, not other law 
enforcement violators, that it will include a redress mechanism if passengers believe 
they have been unfairly or incorrectly selected for additional screening (Sternstein, 
2004), and it will not initially have new data requirements for airline reservations, but 
it will be looking at whether those are necessary [Singel, 2004]). See Table 3 for 
comparison of the passenger screening systems. That said, while CAPPS II screens an 
average of 16 percent of air passengers, Secure Flight will, according to the TSA, still 
screen five or six percent (Sternstein, 2004) and clearly this many passengers are not 
all known or suspected terrorists. 
  
 
  
Under the CAPPS II scheme airlines asked passengers for personal details at the 
reservation stage, including full name, date of birth, home address, and home 
telephone number (DHS, 2004b) and used the PNR (Passenger Name Record) 
generated by booking systems (such as Galileo/Apollo, Sabre, Amadeus and 
Worldspan) for booking flights, hotels and car hire. A PNR is a record that contains 
detailed information about an individual’s travel that consists of information provided 
by the passenger at the reservation stage. The PNR varies between booking systems 
but usually includes a minimum of passenger name, reservation date, travel agency, 
travel itinerary, form of payment, and flight number. In May 2004, the European 
Union agreed to 34 field PNRs being transferred to U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, including credit card information (Spy Blog, 2004) [see Table 4]. Using 
this information CAPPS II verified the identity of the passenger and conducted a risk 
assessment using commercial and government data, and updated the TSA’s 
“Passenger and Aviation Security Screening Records” (PASSR) database (Hasbrouck, 
undated). The risk assessment resulted in an assigned screening level — no risk, 
unknown or elevated risk, or high risk. Based on the assigned screening passengers 
could be detained, interrogated or made subject to additional searches. Importantly, 
the rules of grammar that lie at the root of these determinations are purposefully secret, 
being classified “Sensitive Security Information”, and as such not open to scrutiny (in 
terms of independent verification of their effectiveness) or informed challenge (in 
terms of equity issues, such as racial profiling). CAPPS II was criticized for a failing 
on normative grounds and replaced due to the ease with the “system could be beat 
with fake identification, the system’s reliance on commercial databases widely 
acknowledged to be riddled with errors, and the fact that the system compromised the 
privacy of airline travelers without making nation’s airliners safer.” (DHS, 2004c) 
TSA also acknowledged fear of “mission creep” as a factor. 
  
Table 4: PNR data elements required by U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection from air carriers 
Source: Spy Blog, 2004 
1. PNR record locator code 
2. Date of reservation 
3. Date(s) of intended travel 
4. Name 
5. Other names on PNR 
6. Address 
7. All forms of payment information 
8. Billing address 
9. Contact telephone numbers 
10. All travel itinerary for specific PNR 
11. Frequent flyer information (limited to 
miles flown and address(es)) 
12. Travel agency 
13. Travel agent 
14. Code share PNR information 
15. Travel status of passenger 
16. Split/Divided PNR information 
17. Email address 
18. Ticketing field information 
19. General remarks 
20. Ticket number 
21. Seat number 
22. Date of ticket issuance 
23. No show history 
24. Bag tag numbers 
25. Go show information 
26. OSI information (Other 
Supplementary Information) 
27. SSI/SSR information Special Service 
Information/Request (e.g. assistance/diet)
28. Received from information 
29. All historical changes to the PNR 
30. Number of travelers on PNR 
31. Seat information 
32. One–way tickets 
33. Any collected APIS information 
34. ATFQ fields (Automatic Ticket Fare 
Quote) 
  
That said, the Secure Flight program is a scaled back version of CAPPS II not a 
completely new system and Lockheed Martin Management and Data Systems, the 
CAPPS II contractors, will develop and operate the Secure Flight program for the 
TSA. Accordingly, as stated by TSA, 
  
“Secure Flight will involve the comparison of information 
in PNRs for domestic flights to names in the Terrorist 
Screening Database (TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist 
Screening Center (TSC) [housed by the FBI and presently 
includes 120,000 names (Singel 2004) [9]], to include the 
expanded TSA No–Fly and Selectee Lists, in order to 
identify individuals known or reasonably suspected to be 
engaged in terrorist activity. TSA will apply, within the 
Secure Flight system, a streamlined version of the existing 
CAPPS rule set related to suspicious indicators associated 
with travel behavior, as identified in passengers’ itinerary–
specific PNR.” (DHS, 2004c) 
  
In the test phase, passenger identifying information will be cross–referenced to 
commercial data held by data aggregators, specifically those who provide services to 
banking, mortgage and credit industries to check authenticity, accuracy and for 
anomalies. 
It is likely that US–VISIT and Secure Flight will be supplemented by other systems. 
For example, the TSA are piloting another passenger profiling system, SPOT 
(Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques) (Donnelly, 2004). This system 
aims to use staff to identify suspicious individuals by using the principles of 
surveillance and detection (rather than by technology alone). Passengers who exhibit 
unusual or anxious behavior will be identified for extra screening through face–to–
face interviews with local police to determine whether any threat exists. If the pilot is 
successful it will be rolled out to the 429 commercial airports in the U.S. In addition, 
the U.S. State Department is hoping to move to a system of e–passports (so called 
“smart passports”) using embedded RFIDs that will store basic data, including the 
passport holder’s name, date of birth and place of birth, but has enough memory to 
also store biometric data, including digital fingerprints, photos and iris scans (Gilbert, 
2004). 
Initially, Project Semaphore will target the six million passengers who travel on so–
called “high risk” routes to and from the U.K. It started operation as a 39–month pilot 
scheme in December 2004. In phase one it will use passenger information supplied by 
airlines in advance of travel to screen individuals as they enter and leave the U.K., 
with information being checked against a database of existing passenger name records 
and assessed in relation to “risk scales” to identify security risks (Best, 2005). In early 
February 2005, the Home Office also announced that all visa applicants will be 
fingerprinted once they arrive at U.K. ports of entry. Further, Project IRIS (Iris 
Recognition Immigration System), will be piloted from February 2005 at Heathrow. 
IRIS aims to speed up the admission of pre–assessed bona fide travelers, through iris 
scanning technology, and is due be fully operational by the summer of 2005 (U.K. 
Home Office, 2004). Enrollment will be voluntary and those accepted into the 
program will have their eyes filmed using a standard video camera to capture their iris 
patterns, this being checked in a special fast–track lane at airports to verify personal 
identification (McCue, 2004). Similar systems are being piloted elsewhere in Europe 
(Sharma, 2004). It is envisaged that by 2008 the e–Borders program will record all 
movement into and out of Britain and provide a “comprehensive passenger movement 
audit trail”. (Besides passenger tracking, the U.K. government is also pushing forward 
with controversial legislation for national ID card and database based on biometric 
technology.) 
Taken together these systems aim to create a 
dossier of travel for individuals that last a lifetime. 
Taken together these systems aim to create a dossier of travel for individuals that last 
a lifetime. In short, all air (indeed international) travel will be collected and linked to 
biographic and biometric information and used to screen individual travel behavior. 
Moreover, these systems are representative of the capture model wherein the 
mechanisms of work are also the techniques of surveillance, but they retain the utility 
of statist, mass surveillance (hence our notion of a hybrid capture–surveillance model). 
Here, the grammars of action are the formalized rules of assessment at the heart of the 
systems (US–VISIT, APIS, Secure Flight) with biographic and biometric capta the 
basic ontology. Clearly these systems actively shape, both implicitly and explicitly, 
the nature and procedures of travel (rather than simply surveying). In explicit terms, 
travelers have to acquire new machine–readable passports, submit to biometric capta 
generation, and experience extra security and immigration checks. In implicit terms 
(to travelers at least, explicit to workers), how the travel industry is organized, its 
procedures, operations and work practices are altered. Moreover, the databases, 
criteria, mechanisms and algorithms underpinning the screening people are 
impenetrable except for those in control. 
  
 
Discussion 
Even from a cursory analysis such as presented in this paper it should be clear that 
capture–surveillance systems raise a number of questions concerning the changing 
nature of governmentality, the implications of these changes, and how the 
transformations taking place should be theorized. So far, we have outlined a number 
of new systems with regards air travel and suggested that the transformations taking 
place are best understood though the notion of a hybrid capture–surveillance system 
embedded in. In this section, we examine in brief some of the shortcomings of these 
new systems, and how despite concerns and fallibilities they retain hegemonic status 
through the implementation of mundane management. 
In April 2004, The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published a list of seven 
reasons to question the integrity and employment of passenger screening and profiling 
systems. These reasons focused on errors, due process, cost and impact. First, the 
ACLU suggest, and as the literature makes clear, that capture–surveillance systems 
are not as infallible as their developers suggest, being open to both biographical and 
biometric errors. For example, biographical errors include recording mistakes such as 
typos, non–updates (e.g., change of address), missing or misleading fields; and, 
mismatching errors, especially based on names. These errors are especially prevalent 
in commercial databases sometimes used in profiling systems. Biometric errors 
include the Failure To Enroll Rate (FTER), wherein the biometric is either 
unrecognizable or not of a sufficiently high standard (e.g., worn fingerprints), a False 
Non–Match Rate (FNMR), wherein a subsequent reading does not properly match the 
enrolled biometric (e.g., face aging), and false positives, wherein a system is so large 
that there are many near matches leading to people being falsely identified. The 
ACLU report that with a 99.9 percent accuracy rate there will errors with respect to 
one million transactions and approximately 100,000 travelers. The TSA are predicting 
an error rate of at least four percent error (or four million people) seriously 
undermining the effectiveness and integrity of the system. 
Second, with respect to due process, the ACLU points out that travelers will be judged 
largely in secret with the findings non–disclosed, and moreover there will be a limited 
process of notification, correction and appeal. Third, the ACLU suggests that the new 
systems place an unnecessary burden on airlines, travel agents and the public by 
passing the costs for a flawed and suspect system onto them. Fourth, the ACLU 
identifies three negative impacts with respect to individuals: privacy infringement 
through the creation of lifetime travel dossiers; potential discriminatory impact by 
fostering systematic unequal treatment (e.g., the so–called “flying while Arab” effect 
where those of Arab descent are subject to extra screening and profile based simply 
on race and ethnicity); and, the potential for control creep. 
... travelers will be judged largely in secret with 
the findings non–disclosed, and moreover there 
will be a limited process of notification, correction 
and appeal. 
Control creep occurs when “social control apparatus progressively expands and 
penetrates (or ‘creeps’) into different social arenas, in response to a set of inchoate 
fears about a sense of security in late–modernity.” [10] This control creep can happen 
in at least three ways (ACLU, 2004). First, more and more capta is generated in an 
effort to be exhaustive and comprehensive in profiling. Second, capta becomes used 
for purposes different to those it was generated for. Third, the system is extended to 
other social arenas. In other words, technologies designed to identify, monitor and 
regulate one set of people (e.g., terrorists) in one kind of social space (e.g. airports) 
are expanded in scope to other social arenas (such as flagging so–called “dead–beat 
dads” who fail to make child support payments). For example, airport security 
measures are extended to other forms of public transport, are used to “protect” 
national monuments, and employed to monitor flows of traffic and goods on 
highways and through ports, and are used to identify criminals, defaulters, etc. Such 
extensions raises a number of fears with respect to civil liberties and privacy 
infringement, social sorting, and the limiting of social freedoms on the basis of 
religious and cultural identities (Graham and Wood, 2003; Lyon, 2003). That is, these 
systems and their capta will not simply be used to ensure safe and secure travel, but 
will be applied to other aspects of life in ways hidden to individuals yet actively 
shaping their worlds (including discriminatory effects, limiting their ability to travel, 
their access to certain services and goods, making it easier for business to enact 
differential pricing schemes, and so on). 
Given the potential for capture errors, flaws in procedures and structures, and 
potential impacts and misuses of the systems there has, to date, been remarkably little 
mass, organized resistance to new capture–surveillance systems by either individuals, 
political lobby groups or other states. The resistance that has occurred is either 
expressed in disquiet, individual resistances such as boycotts of travel to particular 
destinations, or legal challenges to state policy by groups such as the ACLU. These 
resistances, however, are a long way short of a tipping point wherein resistance 
becomes so great that it starts to undermine the system and places pressure on 
governments, airports and airlines to modify or abandon systems. Revisiting our 
earlier discussion, we posit that this lack of overt, organized resistance is due to five 
reasons that instill measures of self–disciplining and work to maintain the new 
hegemonic formation. 
First, people have been persuaded to the new emerging logic either through 
disciplining or seduction. In this context, advances in surveillance technologies and 
systems are seen as necessary to: ensure safety and security in an unstable world, 
particularly in relation to the so–called “war on terror”; police immigration and issues 
of citizenship given moral panics surrounding “illegal” immigrants and asylum 
seekers; and, reduce costs and increase the economic competitiveness and 
productivity of airlines and airports. In the case of U.S., the DHS, and in the U.K., the 
Home Office, have mobilized discourses of safety, security, efficiency, anti–fraud, 
and citizenship, at the same time continuing to warn of imminent terrorist threat and 
the dangers of (illegal) immigrants, in order to justify and legitimate mundane 
governmentality. For example, in the Project Semaphore press release U.K. 
Immigration Minister, Des Browne stated: 
  
“e–Borders, along with biometric ID cards, shows how we 
are using new technology to develop embarkation controls 
for the 21st century. Access to information about 
passengers before they travel will help in the fight against 
illegal immigration, particularly document and identity 
abuse. It will also aid law enforcement and counter 
terrorism. At the same time, technology will allow us to 
speed through low risk passengers, helping British business 
and visitors to the UK.” (U.K. Home Office, 2004) 
  
DHS similarly argues that these systems will produce consistency and fairness, while 
at the same time reducing costs and efficiency: 
  
“Secure Flight will automate the vast majority of watch list 
comparisons; will allow TSA to apply more consistent 
procedures where automated resolution of potential matches 
is not possible; and will allow for more consistent response 
procedures at airports for those passengers identified as 
potential matches. ... It will dramatically improve the 
administration of comparisons of passenger information 
with data maintained by TSC and will reduce the long–term 
costs to air carriers and passengers associated with 
maintaining the present system, which is operated 
individually by each air carrier that flies in the United 
States.” (DHS, 2004c) 
  
Second, people see the changes that are occurring as simply an extension of previous 
systems, which they are already conditioned to. In other words, most people do not 
see the introduction of biometrics as a step change in the levels and sophistication of 
surveillance, particularly in an environment that has long been subject to levels of 
surveillance in excess of nearly any other space. Rather, new technologies and 
systems are seen as the outcome of an inevitable progression as new developments 
occur. This viewpoint is supported by marketing and lobbying efforts on the part of IT 
vendors and technology consultants. 
Third, given this progression, the new grammars of action enacted and how 
surveillance is structured and used is seen as an inherent, and therefore 
unchallengeable, aspect of the system. That is, the system is necessarily built in a 
certain way, with certain parameters, thus grammars of action are hard–coded into the 
make-up of the system in a “natural”, “neutral” way (that’s the way it had to be to 
fulfill certain requirements such as safety and security targets), rather than the system 
and its parameters being seen as something that are relational and contingent in their 
formulation, design and implementation. 
Fourth, the point of contact for most travelers is relatively painless — a few security 
questions, a swipe of a passport, a finger on a scanner plate — with the bulk of 
screening taking place in the background and unbeknownst to them. In this sense, 
while being subject to new capture modes of surveillance, this exposure is seemingly 
benign and routine rather than invasive. 
... the nature of the surveillance system works to 
instill a deep level of reflexive self–disciplining. 
Fifth, we believe that many people do not openly resist new capture–surveillance 
systems because they are worried of the consequences protest. The fear in these cases 
is one of mistreatment when traveling (such as extra security checks and delays) or 
blacklisting from certain travel all together (for example, being barred entry to a 
country). Here, the nature of the surveillance system works to instill a deep level of 
reflexive self–disciplining. That is, individuals are wary of new systems fearing 
potential misuse and abuse but feel powerless to openly challenge the system for fear 
of inciting those potential misuses and abuses. There is a certain logic to these fears 
given the “cold”, officious treatment by security personnel and immigration officers 
and stories circulating in the news media and individual networks of mistreatment 
when traveling. These stories are either dismissed by officials as false or hearsay or 
portrayed as inevitable, “minor” and rare misunderstandings and the price of secure 
and safe travel. In other words, stories are undermined in order to reassert the 
operating doxa. 
Programs such as Project Semaphore and Secure Flight then are multifaceted, used for 
different purposes — the fight against illegal immigrants and fraud, to ensure law 
enforcement and counter–terrorism measures, to improve efficiency and reduce costs 
for both the state and the airline industry. At the same time these programs argue that 
they minimize hassle for low–risk passengers. As such they are cross–justified, 
playing on peoples’ fears and prejudices, travelers’ and airlines’ annoyance at 
inefficiencies and waste, and arguing that if you have nothing to hide, you have 
nothing to fear. As a result, taken together the five reasons outlined have led to the 
almost carte blanche development of new capture–surveillance systems, with 
associated legislation and systems of government. 
  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have sought to outline the ways in which the use of software and 
information systems has transformed the monitoring, registration and regulation of air 
travelers introducing a new mode of governmentality that we have termed mundane 
management. In short, software has led to a step–change in the form and scope of 
surveillance technologies employed by airports and airlines for screening and 
profiling passengers. These changes are supported by a powerful discursive regime 
that employs seductive discourses of safety, security, anti–fraud, citizenship, 
competitiveness and productivity and which works to silence resistance. 
Recent literatures have tended to use a Foucaultian model to understand the nature of 
air travel surveillance. We are sympathetic to this position, but believe it more 
productive to re–think this model with respect to Agre’s capture model. The resulting 
capture–surveillance model recognizes that the employment of software systems in 
the various tasks that constitute air travel (booking flights, checking in, security 
checks, immigration, etc.) means that the processing and monitoring of passengers has 
become highly formalized through grammars of action utilizing highly specific 
biographical and biometric capta throughout the air travel assemblage. Consequently, 
capture has become an integral part of air travel, actively reshaping how an activity is 
undertaken, rather than simply working to discipline behavior. Further these systems, 
in contrast to Foucault’s observations about surveillance being openly visible (and 
this is its power to discipline), are largely hidden and covert in operation. In the case 
of air travel they are also, contra to Agre’s capture thesis, centralized and statist in 
nature. 
Paradoxically, these systems have significant implications to civil liberties and 
privacy, especially through control creep, and yet are ambivalently accepted. In this 
sense they constitute a form of mundane management that has quickly become banal 
in its operation and thus hegemonic in status. As noted in the previous section, the 
lack of resistance to systems that have very significant powers of screening, profiling 
and disciplining is, we believe, the result of how the systems have been “sold” to the 
public through a discursive regime that portrays the resulting systems as having 
numerous positive effects and is technologically inevitable, but also works to silence 
dissent through potential threats to civil liberties. 
While we have focused on air travel in this paper, it should be noted that systems of 
capture–surveillance are being developed with respect to other domains such as 
automobiles (Dodge and Kitchin, forthcoming). Again, while driving and vehicles 
have long been subject to regulation and surveillance, a plethora of new location–
based, dynamic capture–surveillance technologies are being developed and publicly 
and commercially implemented. For example, cars are increasingly being fitted with 
software systems that not only monitor and mediate the engine and other systems but 
also record the driver’s driving; GPS–based navigation and tracking systems are being 
used by car rental and anti–theft companies monitor the real–time location of a 
vehicle to the nearest few meters; a range of “smart” media have been added to road 
infrastructure including speed, red light and lane camera systems using telematic 
networks and automatically tolling systems. 
In many ways, these systems raise more worrying questions and concerns given they 
are being applied to a much more common, fluid and diverse aspect of daily life and 
therefore have the potential to develop in unanticipated ways creating new forms of 
governmentality. Whereas air–travel capture–surveillance system are statist and 
explicitly built to monitor and control along well–defined lines, automobile systems 
are being designed and built for diverse purposes, often being used for purposes 
beyond their initial intention (e.g., navigational aids in rental cars being used to track 
renters movements and to impose misuse fines — driving out of state or off–road; or 
parents tracking a child driver’s movements), and are being developed and operated 
by multiple agencies including the state and its agencies, car manufacturers, rental car 
companies, and other third parties. As such, while more research is needed to tease 
out the changing regulatory nature of air travel, there is perhaps a more pressing need 
to examine capture–surveillance systems in all their forms across multiple domains 
and their effects vvis–à–vis governmentality.  
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Notes 
1. Jensen (cited in Becker, 1952) details that capta are units of data that have been 
selected and harvested from the sum of all potential data. Here, data (derived from the 
Latin dare, meaning ‘to give’) is the total sum of facts that an entity can potentially 
‘give’ to government or business or whomever is constructing a database. Capta 
(derived from the Latin capere, meaning ‘to take’) are those facts that those 
constructing the database decide to ‘take’ given that they cannot record or store 
everything. 
2. Agre, 1994, p. 754. 
3. Wardrip–Fruin, 2003, p. 757. 
4. Agre, 1994, p. 752. 
5. Wardrip–Fruin, 2003, p. 757. 
6. A cross–cutting initiative co–ordinated by the Home Office in partnership with key 
border control, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
7. Federal Register, 2003, cited in Privacy International, 2004. 
8. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005. “Testing of radio frequency 
identification (RFID) technology at land borders questions and answers,” Press 
release, at http://www.dhs.gov, accessed 20 August 2006. 
9. This figure is suspiciously the same as that generated by the Multistate Anti–
TeRrorism Information eXchange (MATRIX) programme. This system combines 
information from government databases and private–sector data companies about 
individuals, and makes that data available for search by government officials. After 
9/11 this system was used to identify, by calculating “terrorist quotient” suspected 
terrorists residing in the U.S. Some 120,000 individuals fitted the “characteristics” of 
a terrorist. 
10. Innes, 2001, no pagination. 
  
References 
P.E. Agre, 1994. “Surveillance and capture: Two models of privacy,” Information 
Society, volume 10, number 2, pp. 101–127. Reprinted In: N. Wardrip–Fruin and N. 
Montfort (editors), 2003. The NewMediaReader. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
L. Althusser, 1971. Lenin and philosophy, and other essays. Translated from the 
French by B. Brewster. London: New Left Books. 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 2004. “The seven problems with CAPPS 
II,” at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=15426&c=130, accessed 20 
August 2006. 
H. Becker, 1952. “Science, culture, and society,” Philosophy of Science, volume 19, 
number 4, pp. 273–287. 
J. Best, 2005. “Fingerprints, iris recognition and tagging ‘to cut immigration’,” at 
http://software.silicon.com/security/0,39024655,39127657,00.htm, accessed 20 
August 2006. 
Canadian Government, 2004. “Securing an open society: Canada’s national security 
policy,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1363, accessed 
20 August 2006. 
M. Dodge and R. Kitchin, forthcoming. “The automatic management of drivers and 
driving spaces,” Geoforum in press. 
M. Dodge and R. Kitchin, 2005. “Codes of life: Identification codes and the machine–
readable world,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, volume 23, 
number 6, pp. 851–881. 
M. Dodge and R. Kitchin, 2004. “Flying through code/space: The real virtuality of air 
travel,” Environment and Planning A, volume 36, number 2, pp. 195–211. 
S.B. Donnelly, 2004. “Spotting the airline terror threat,” Time (2 October), at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,708924,00.html, accessed 20 August 
2006. 
European Commission. Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to 
public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens (IDABC), 2004. “INT: US 
Administration extends US–VISIT programme to visa waiver countries,” (5 April), at 
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/2382/348, accessed 20 August 2006. 
Federal Register, 2003. “Department of Homeland Security [DHS/ICE–CBP–CIS–
001] Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records,” Federal Register, volume 68, number 
239 (12 December), and at 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/library/USVISITfederalregister0
3-30761.pdf, accessed 20 August 2006. 
Findbiometrics, 2003. “Fact Sheet: US–VISIT Program — October 30, 2003,” 
http://www.findbiometrics.com/viewnews.php?id=587, accessed 20 August 2006. 
M. Foucault, 1978. The history of sexuality, volume one. New York: Pantheon Books. 
M. Foucault, 1976. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. London: Allen 
Lane. 
A. Gilbert, 2005. “States to test ID chips on foreign visitors,” CNET News.com (26 
January), at 
http://news.com.com/States+to+test+ID+chips+on+foreign+visitors/2100-1039_3-
5552120.html, accessed 20 August 2006. 
A. Gilbert, 2004. “U.S. moves closer to e–passports,” CNET News.com (25 October), 
at http://news.com.com/U.S.+moves+closer+to+e-passports/2100-1012_3-
5425314.html, accessed 20 August 2006. 
S. Graham and D. Wood, 2003. “Digitising surveillance: Categorisation, space and 
inequality,” Critical Social Policy, volume 23, pp. 227–248. 
E. Hasbrouck, undated. “What’s in a Passenger Name Record (PNR)?” 
http://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR.html, accessed 20 August 2006. 
E. Higgs E, 2001. “The rise of the information state: The development of central state 
surveillance of the citizen in England, 1500–2000,” Journal of Historical Sociology, 
volume 14, number 2, pp. 175–197. 
M. Innes, 2001. “Control creep,” Sociological Research Online, volume 6, number 3, 
at http://www.socresonline.org.uk/6/3/innes.html, accessed 20 August 2006. 
J. Leyden, 2004. “Accenture wins $10bn homeland security gig,” The Register (2 
June), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/06/02/accenture_homeland_security_win/, 
accessed 20 August 2006. 
D. Lyon, 2003. “Surveillance as social sorting: Computer codes and mobile bodies,” 
In: D. Lyon (editor). Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk, and digital 
discrimination. London: Routledge, pp. 13–30. 
A. McCue, 2004. “Iris recognition to be installed across UK airports,” Silicon.com (15 
June), at http://software.silicon.com/security/0,39024655,39121368,00.htm, accessed 
20 August 2006. 
Privacy International, 2004. “The Enhanced U.S. Border Surveillance System. An 
Assessment of the Implications of US VISIT,” at 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/rpt/dangers_of_visit.pdf, 
accessed 20 August 2006. 
P. Rothman, 2004. “Technology on the line,,” Government Security (1 April), 
http://govtsecurity.com/mag/technology_line/, accessed 20 August 2006. 
D.C. Sharma, 2004. “Protecting your ID: German airport begins biometric checking 
Lufthansa chooses iris scanning over other options,” Silicon.com (16 February), at 
http://www.silicon.com/research/specialreports/protectingid/0,3800002220,39118396,
00.htm, accessed 20 August 2006. 
R. Singel, 2004. “Secure flight gets wary welcome,” Wired News (27 August), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,64748,00.html, accessed 20 August 2006. 
Spy Blog, 2004. “EU Commission betrays Passenger Name Record data privacy to 
USA despite EU Parliament” (31 May), at 
http://www.spy.org.uk/spyblog/2004/05/eu_commission_betrays_passenge.html, 
accessed 20 August 2006. 
A. Sternstein, 2004. “TSA launches Secure Flight” (27 August), at 
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2004/0823/web-tsa-08-27-04.asp, accessed 20 
August 2006. 
U.K. Home Office, 2004. “Cutting–edge technology to secure UK borders for 21st 
century,” at 
http://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=130801, 
accessed 20 August 2006. 
U.S. Customs, 2001. “New law makes APIS a must For international air carriers,” at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2001/December/custoday_apis.xml, accessed 
20 August 2006. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, undated a. “C–TPAT fact sheet and frequently 
asked questions,” at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_faq.xml, 
accessed 20 August 2006. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, undated b. “CSI in brief” (15 February), at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_in_brief.
xml, accessed 20 August 2006. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), undated. “US–VISIT FAQs: NSEERS 
and US–VISIT,” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=91&content=4095. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004a. “US–VISIT Program, Increment 2, 
Privacy Impact Assessment,” (14 September), at 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/US-VISIT_PIA_09142004.pdf, accessed 20 
August 2006. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004b. “Fact sheet: CAPPS II at a glance,” at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3162, accessed 20 August 2006. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004c. “Transport Security Administration. 
Privacy Impact Assessment. Secure Flight Test Phase,” (TSA–2004–19160), 
http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Secure_Flight_PIA_Notice_9.21.04.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003. “US–VISIT Program, Increment 1 
Privacy Impact Assessment Executive Summary,” (18 December), at 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/VISITPIAfinalexecsum3.pdf, accessed 20 
August 2006. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 2005. “Secure flight development and testing 
under way, but risks should be managed as system is further developed” (GAO–05–
356), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05356.pdf, accessed 20 August 2006. 
UT Watch, 2003. “Special registration under NSEERS” (7 January), at 
http://www.utwatch.org/security/nseers.html, accessed 20 August 2006. 
N. Wardrip–Fruin, 2003. “Introduction to surveillance and capture: Two models of 
privacy,” In: N. Wardrip–Fruin and N. Montfort (editors). The NewMediaReader. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 737–739. 
 
Editorial history 
Paper received 15 August 2006; accepted 25 August 2006. 
 
 
Copyright ©2006, First Monday
Copyright ©2006, Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge 
Software and the mundane management of air travel by Rob Kitchin and Martin 
Dodge 
First Monday, special issue number 7 (September 2006), 
URL: http://firstmonday.org/issues/special11_9/kitchin/index.html 
 
